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On July 8, 1996, the World Court, the International Court of Justice
at the Hague, banned the bomb.I
This was in answer to a question certified by the United Nations
General Assembly, "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstance permitted under international law? "2 The answer was no,
* Mr. Hunt earned an LL.B. from Columbia University in 1965. He has practiced in
New York and the District of Columbia and is currently an independent researcher in Bethesda,
Maryland. An earlier version of this article appeared at http://www.gthunt.com.
1. Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.C.J. Reports 226-593 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. An earlier petition from the
World Health Organization was dismissed for want of standing in the petitioner. Legality of the
Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. Reports 66-224 (July 8).
2. G.A. Res. 75K, U.N. GAOR 49th Sess., U.N. Doe. AI49IPV.90 (1994). See also
1994 U.N.Y.B, 157-58, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.1. The resolution helped the Court out a bit by
recalling "resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83
G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980, 36/92 I of 9 December 1981, 45/59 B
of 4 December 1990 and 46/37 D of 6 December 1991, in which it [the General Assembly]
declared that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter and a crime against
humanity.. . " Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 226-28.
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nuclear warfare is not permitted. The World Court has jurisdiction to give
such answers, and even though the Court has no more battalions than the
Pope or the Archbishop of Canterbury,' still it is the closest thing we have
to a final authority in international law, so the answer must have some
importance. It is astonishing how little reaction and comment this ruling
has generated.'
In 1998, about two years after the ruling, India and Pakistan blasted
their way into the nuclear club. A massive diplomatic response is now
trying to persuade them to leave peacefully.' But the United States and the
Russian Federation each have many times the deliverable warheads of all
the other nuclear powers combined,7 and present plans will allow those two
arsenals to continue at omnicidal and ecocidal levels into the indefinite
future. India and Pakistan can excuse themselves as small contributors to
the nuclear threat, negligible when compared to the United States and
Russia.
Long before the Indian and Pakistani bombs, the two great nuclear
arsenals were being questioned by recovering Cold Warriors with
impeccable military credentials-retired CIA chief Admiral Stansfield
Turner,$ for instance, and retired SAC commander General George Lee
3. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 226, 227, 232-38 (discussing Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 25, 1945, arts. 65-68, 59 Stat. 1031, 1063-64). The Statute
appears annually as an appendix in Yearbook of the United Nations. See, e.g., 1994 U.N.Y.B.
1492, 1496, U.N. Sales No. E.95.I.1, app. II.
4. Responding to criticism from the Catholic Church, Joseph Stalin replied, "The Pope!
How many divisions does he have?" WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE GATHERING STORM 135
(1948) [emphasis in original].
5. But see LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES & PHILIPPE SANDS, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1999); JOHN
BURROUGHS, THE LEGALITY OF THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A GUIDE TO THE
HISTORIC OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1998); HARALAMBOS
ATHANASOPULOS, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000); VED P. NANDA
& DAVID KRIEGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD COURT (1998).
6. U.N. SCOR, 3888th mtg., S/PRST/1998/17, 29 May 1998; S.C. Res. 1172, 3890th
mtg., 6 June 1998; Eur. Parl. Doc. A4-0217/98, 19 June 1998. Many reactions to the Indian
and Pakistani tests are collected on the web site for the Council for a Livable World at
http://www.clw.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2001). See also Barbara Crossette, Council Chides
Pakistanis and Indians, Too, N. Y. TIMES, May 30, 1998, at AS.
7. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists regularly publishes nuclear scorecards. See, e.g.,
U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1996, BULL. OF ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Jan./Feb. 1997, at
70-71; Russian Nuclear Forces, 2001, BULL. OF ATOM. SCIENTISTS, May/June 2001, at 78-79.
8. STANSFIELD TURNER, CAGING THE NUCLEAR GENIE: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE
FOR GLOBAL SECURITY (1997); Paul Hendrickson, Disarmed and Dangerous? Stansfield Turner
Has an Explosive Idea to Reduce Nuclear Weapons, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1997, at Cl.
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Butler. 9 Their old colleagues from the deep bunkers of the Iron Mountain
era were finding it necessary to circle wagons and defend MAD, overkill,
and the rest of the nuclear status quo.'0 The World Court's ruling shows
that law has a role to play in this debate. Some of the discipline necessary
to call the world back from its long flirtation with extinction may come
from legal reasoning, and may even come from one of the law's most
disparaged departments, international law.
Therefore, let us examine the World Court's ruling. The lack of
reaction and comment about the ruling may be largely the Court's own
fault. The ruling consists of a formal dispositif," which seems to say there
may be exceptions to the bomb's illegality; a rambling and diffuse
"Advisory Opinion" by the whole Court,' 2 which offers little usable
analysis of the issues; and fourteen separate opinions, one from each
judge, no two concurring with one another. " Most of the discussion is
hopelessly abstract. As a political rallying point the ruling is unpromising.
Clashing viewpoints and differing legal traditions from around the world,
which could make the World Court an intellectual clearinghouse for the
best hopes of humankind, came together, and a decision was reached to
condemn the bomb. But the aspirations of Nuremberg were drowned by
the confusions of Babel.
I. THE COURT HOLDS NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUBJECT TO LAW
Let us start with the World Court's formal dispositif. It has two
sections. In section 1, the Court, by a vote of thirteen to one, accepted
jurisdiction and agreed to issue an advisory opinion. In section 2, the
Court held:
9. JONATHAN SCHELL, THE GIFT OF TIME: THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS Now (1998) (assembling a variety of anti-nuclear views). See also George Lee
Butler, Time to End the Age of Nukes, BULL. OF ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Mar./Apr., 1997, at 33-36;
General Andrew Goodpaster, An Evolving U.S. Nuclear Posture, BULL. OF ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
Mar./Apr., 1996, at 52-55; George Lee Butler, The General's Bombshell; What Happened When
I Called for Phasing Out the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal, THE WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1997 at Cl. See
also the proposals of Bruce Blair and the former chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Senator Sam Nunn, in From Nuclear Deterrence to Mutual Safety; As Russia's Arsenal
Crumbles, It's Time to Act, THE WASH. POST, June 22, 1997, at Cl.
10. Several are quoted in Hendrickson, supra note 8.
11. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 265-67.
12. Id. at 227-65.
13. All fourteen can be found in Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 268-593. Nine of
them are also published in 35 I.L.M. 809, 832-938. The other five can be found in 35 I.L.M.
1343, 1343-58.
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[(2)]A. Unanimously, There is in neither customary nor
conventional international law any specific authorization of
the threat or use of nuclear weapons;
[(2)]B. By eleven votes to three, There is in neither
customary nor conventional international law any
comprehensive and universal prohibition of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons as such;
[(2)]C. Unanimously, A threat or use of force by means
of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph
4, of the United Nations Charter and that fails to meet all
the requirements of Article 51, is unlawful;
[(2)]D. Unanimously, A threat or use of nuclear weapons
should also be compatible.with the requirements of the
international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly
those of the principles and rules of international
humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations
under treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal
with nuclear weapons;
[(2)]E. By seven votes to seven, by the President's casting
vote, It follows from the above-mentioned requirements
that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally
be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law;
However, in view of the current state of international law,
and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot
conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of
a State would be at stake.
[(2)]F. Unanimously, There exists an obligation to pursue
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control. 4
14. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 266-67 (judges' votes omitted).
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Paragraph (2)A says there is no specific authorization for nuclear weapons.
This states the obvious, but it is far from trivial. If the nuclear powers'
reservations of their rights had been as successful as they claim, surely
there would be some specific authorization somewhere. This paragraph
makes clear that Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not precedents amounting to
such a specific authorization.
Paragraph (2)B says there is no "comprehensive and universal
prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such." Language so
loaded with qualification cries out for explanation. It is heavy with what
logicians call negatives pregnant. Two of the three judges who voted
against this paragraph-the three were Christopher G. Weeramantry of Sri
Lanka, Mohamed Shahabuddeen of Guyana, and Abdul G. Koroma of
Sierra Leone-cited the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol as such a prohibition."
The Court did not go along with this, so we must accept that the bold
proposition that the bomb is illegal as a poisonous gas did not survive the
Court's strict constructionism. One of the three judges, however, pointed
to the negatives pregnant and claimed that the Court did not really deny the
possibility of some nuclear prohibition: "The specificity conveyed by the
words 'as such' enables me to recognize that '[t]here is in neither
customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive and
universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons as such.' "26
Nevertheless, he voted against the paragraph, he said, because "the words
'as such' do not outweigh a general suggestion that there is no prohibition
at all of the use of nuclear weapons. "1 Both the nuclearists and the anti-
nuclearists on the Court indulged in much of this kind of hair-splitting.
In any event, it was a "comprehensive and universal"-strong
words-"as such" prohibition that paragraph (2)B rejected eleven to three.
This rejection is trivial and meaningless as applied to customary law,
which is not written down and therefore cannot prohibit anything "as such"
(that is, by name, explicitly), and it is only a statement of regrettable but
undeniable fact as applied to treaty law as it now stands, because the all-
important Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (below) prohibits possession,
not use, or it prohibits use only by implication. There is less to paragraph
(2)B than meets the eye.
15. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 429, 433 (Opinion of Weeramantry); id. at
429, 508-12 (referencing the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol); id. at 556, 580 (Opinion of Koroma)
(citing Article 23(a) of the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907 as well as the Geneva Gas
protocol of 1925). The third objecting judge cited the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol in support of a
general principle against weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. Nuclear Weapons, supra
note 1, at 375, 403 (Opinion of Shahabuddeen).
16. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 375, 377 (Opinion of Shahabuddeen).
17. Id.
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The unanimous holdings of the next two paragraphs, (2)C and (2)D,
take away in practice more than paragraph (2)B allowed in theory. In
these next paragraphs, the Court finds nuclear weapons firmly under the
moderating hand of international law. The Opinion of the Court notes the
general acceptance by the nuclear States that any use of nuclear weapons is
"indeed restricted by the principles and rules of international law, more
particularly humanitarian law. ... "" "A weapon that is already unlawful
per se, whether by treaty or custom, does not become lawful by reason of
its being used for a legitimate purpose under the Charter,"' 9 i.e., self-
defense, and even self-defense is subject to the rules of necessity and
proportionality.20 Any use of nuclear weapons must take account not only
of the effects of the immediate use but also of the retaliatory use it is likely
to engender.2' It follows that any conceivable use of nuclear weapons
would be illegal. All the negatives pregnant in paragraph (2)B are indeed
gravid with significance. There are customary prohibitions against nuclear
weapons, even if they are not, to the Continental legalist, entirely
"comprehensive" and "universal" and against nuclear weapons "as such."
II. THE COURT CONDEMNS NUCLEAR WEAPONS "GENERALLY"
If the dispositif stopped there, anti-nuclearism would be far ahead.
But there is the exasperating puzzle of paragraph (2)E.
A majority of the Court felt there must be some limit on its
condemnation of nuclear weapons, or at least on the expression of it.
Paragraph 95 of the Opinion says:
In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons,
to which the Court has referred above, the use of such
weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect
for such requirements [the principles and rules of law
applicable in armed conflict]. Nevertheless, the Court
considers that it does not have sufficient elements to enable
18. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 239, 260, which quotes the submissions of
several nuclear States: " 'Restrictions set by the rules applicable to armed conflicts in respect of
means and methods of warfare definitely also extend to nuclear weapons.' (Russian Federation,
CR 95/29, p. 52); 'So far as the customary law of war is concerned, the United Kingdom has
always accepted that the use of nuclear weapons is subject to the general principles of thejus in
bello.' (United Kingdom, CR 95/34, p. 45); and 'The United States has long shared the view
that the law of armed conflict governs the use of nuclear weapons-just as it governs the use of
conventional weapons.' (United States of America, CR 95/34, p. 85)." Id. at 227, 260.
19. Id. at 227, 245 39.
20. Id. at 227, 245 41-44.
21. Id. at 227, 245 43.
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it to conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear
weapons would necessarily be at variance with the
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in
any circumstance.Y
Most jurists, moralists, and logicians would accept this as a hand-
wringing confession of the inevitable limits of human wisdom and
language. But when the same thought appears in paragraph (2)E of the
dispositif, it has become linked to "an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake."13 Would
this mean that the Japanese could have legally used the bomb against
America, had they had it in 1945?24 Or that Hitler could have put nuclear
warheads in his V-2s? This would be an alarming concession, but the
Court does not say nuclear weapons would be legal in such cases. The
Court refuses to rule one way or the other.
The Court has been keeping the discussion on the level of abstract
rules and principles, and avoiding concrete situations, real or hypothetical.
Some of the judges seem to have in mind an all-out nuclear exchange,
while others may be speculating about limited battlefield uses of tactical
warheads under special and well-controlled circumstances, while still
others struggle for a formula that would cover all conceivable scenarios
with the phrase "nuclear weapons" in them. This may be inevitable in an
advisory opinion, which does not give a court the pragmatic benefit of a
factual situation. But here at the eleventh hour, one hypothetical-and a
hypothetical hypothetical at that-is sneaked in and given prominent place.
We could use more discussion of hypotheticals, or we could do without
this one.
The individual opinions put all this in a better light. Four- of the
seven27 judges who voted for paragraph (2)E said explicitly that they
22. Id. at 227, 262-63.
23. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 227, 266.
24. Both id. at 556, 561 (Opinion of Koroma) and id. at 375, 419 n. 33 (Opinion of
Shahabuddeen) point out that this idea of an unlimited right to defend the State was rejected at
Nuremberg.
25. Robert Musil, of Physicians for Social Responsibility, has suggested (orally, in a class)
that the great powers might have taken a more negative attitude toward nuclear weapons and
might have avoided the nuclear arms race entirely if they had first encountered the atomic bomb
as an Axis weapon used against London or San Francisco.
26. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 556-82 (Opinion of Koroma); id. at 330-74
(Opinion of Oda); id. at 375, 376 (Opinion of Shahabuddeen: "My difficulty is with the second
part [of (2)EJ"); id. at 429, 433 (Opinion of Weeramantry: "My considered opinion is that the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is illegal in any circumstances whatsoever" [emphasis in
original]).
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objected only to the limits on the condemnation of nuclear weapons, and
that they thought the condemnation should have been absolute. Only one
of the dissenting seven, Judge Schwebel, candidly argued for the legality
of the bomb." (This leaves two who were ambiguous or unclear,
Guillaume" and Higgins.n) Of the seven ' who voted for the paragraph,
not one of them expressly said he would have voted against it had it been
stronger and had the condemnation been without limits.32 No matter how
the limitations got in there, we have both a clear statement that most uses
of the bomb would be illegal and a possible majority of judges believing
that any use would always be illegal.
III. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY BANS POSSESSION
Whatever the cautionary negatives in the first several paragraphs of
the dispositif, the tone changes in the final paragraph, (2)F. The Court
lays down the law and spells out a clear and unequivocal obligation for
future action: The nuclear signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
must give up their nuclear weapons. The negotiations leading to that treaty
resulted in a bargain between the nuclear States and the non-nuclear States,
with the nuclear States agreeing to Article VI: "Each of the Parties to the
Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control.",33
27. Guillaume, Higgins, Koroma, Oda, Schwebel, Shahabuddeen, and Weeramantry. Id at
266.
28. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 311-29 (Opinion of Schwebel).
29. Id. at 287-93 (Opinion of Guillaunme).
30. Id. at 583-93 (Opinion of Higgins).
31. Id. at 266. The judges are Bedjaoui, Ferrari Bravo, Fleischhauer, Herczegh, Ranjeva,
Shi, and Vereshchetin.
32. Indeed, Ranjeva said, "[If the two clauses of paragraph 2 E had appeared as separate
paragraphs, I would have voted without hesitation in favour of the first clause and, if the
provisions of the Statute and Rules of the Court so allowed, I would have abstained on the second
clause ... " Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 294, 304 (Opinion of Ranjeva). Herczegh said
he believed "the wording of this sentence [the reservation of judgment about nuclear weapons in
extreme circumstances of self-defense] cannot easily be reconciled with the earlier reference to
'all the requirements' of Article 51 of the Charter." Id. at 275, 276 (Opinion of Herczegh).
But, on the other hand, Fleischhauer said there was no ground to hold the law of humanity and
the immunity of neutrals superior to the right of self-defense. Id. at 305-310 (Opinion of
Fleischhauer). Vereshchetin said an absolute prohibition would require a treaty. Id. at 279-81
(Declaration of Vereshchetin).
33. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 227, 263 (quoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, 21 UST 483; TIAS 6839; 729 UNTS 161, Article VI).
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The last paragraph of the dispositif, (2)F, holds the signatory nuclear
States to this agreement. It unanimously decrees that these nuclear powers
are obliged to negotiate complete nuclear disarmament. Paragraph 99 of
the Opinion of the Court amplifies this:
The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a
mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is
an obligation to achieve a precise result-nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects-by adopting a particular
course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on
the matter in good faith.Y
The Court went on to support this voluntarily incurred treaty
obligation, this promise made by each nuclear power to all the other States
signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by citing General Assembly
resolutions from the very first ' onward,3' and the statements of the 1995
NPT review conference." Thus, the Court squarely rejected the notion
that the post-Cold War world order might include the United States and the
Russian Federation bristling with thousands of nuclear weapons each.
IV. NATIONS OUTSIDE THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
When the Court discusses possession, it takes the course of least
resistance and most certainty by leaving unwritten law behind and focusing
on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Little did anyone know how dramatically
attention would shift two years later to nations outside the Treaty, when
two of them, India and Pakistan, would write in subterranean fire the
questions the Court neglected to answer: Is it lawful under international
law, outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for a nation to arm itself with
a nuclear weapon? Is it lawful even if the nation in question has a
traditional enemy that is sure to respond by similarly arming itself? Is it
lawful to start or join a nuclear arms race?
34. Id. at 227, 263-64.
35. Literally the first: Resolution 1(I), of 24 January 1946. Ferrari Bravo stressed the
importance of this resolution, citing, "The United Nations in World Affairs, 1945-1947, 1947,
pp. 391 et seq." Nuclear Weapons, at 282, 283 (Declaration of Ferrari Bravo). See also G.A.
Res. 1946-47 U.N.Y.B. 64-66, U.N. Sales No. 1947.1.18.
36. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 808 A (IX), U.N. Doc. A/2779 (1954); 1954 U.N.Y.B. 20-21,
U.N. Sales No. 1955.1.25. See note 2, supra, for others.
37. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 227, 265 (citing "the final document of the Review
and Extension Conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, held from 17 April to 12 May 1995," as well as the Security Council resolution before
the review conference, S/RES/984 (1995), Apr. 11, 1995).
Hunt 159
160 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:151
The arguments against the lawfulness of any nation, even one outside
the Treaty, acquiring a nuclear weapon are many. Acquiring a nuclear
weapon, especially when one's adversaries are likely to acquire it too, is a
threat to international peace and security. So the UN Security Council said
through its president in 1992: "The proliferation of all weapons of mass
destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security . ... ,
If use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity, then preparation for
use must be at least an inchoate illegality. And when a treaty commands as
much acceptance as has the Non-Proliferation Treaty,39 it may be
declaratory of the jus cogens, the general principles binding on all.40
Perhaps a nation gains nothing by holding back its signature. We can
assume that all these arguments are being made to India and Pakistan-and
to Israel as well, one hopes. But the World Court did not explicitly
address the question of nations outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
V. THE JUDGES' SEPARATE OPINIONS
The fourteen separate opinions, one from each member of the Court,
suggest by their very bulk that the dispositif and its limitations may not
have been the optimum set of compromises. It is too much to expect that
fourteen judges using different languages and grounded in differing legal
traditions might sharpen issues as effectively as, for instance, the nine
members of the United States Supreme Court sometimes do. But we
cannot help but wish that their output might have been both shorter and
clearer.
38. Statement of the President of the Security Council, 1992 U.N.Y.B. at 33, 35, U.N.
Sales No. E.93.I.1.
39. Only India, Pakistan, and Israel have not signed the treaty and have bombs or the
makings of bombs. Cuba and a handful of other small States have not signed: e.g., Cook Islands
and Niue. Brazil, Chile, and Argentina have recently come on board. The dreaded "rogue
States"-Libya, Iraq, Iran, North Korea-have all signed, as have all of the large nuclear
powers: America, Britain, and Russia from the beginning, and China and France since 1992.
The nations resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union have all signed. They have all
become non-nuclear except the Russian Federation. Treaties in Force, 2000, 434. Not since the
founding of the United Nations Organization has any proposal for international good behavior
won such wide acceptance.
40. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; Jonathan I. Charney,
Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1993). But see Anthony D'Amato, It's a
Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens! 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (Fall 1990); Adam Steinfeld, Nuclear
Objections: The Persistent Objector and the Legality of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 62 BROOK.
L. REV. 1635 (Winter 1996).
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A. The Anti-Nuclearists
Three of the separate opinions, long as they are, make good reading
for the anti-nuclearist: Christopher G. Weeramantry of Sri Lanka covered
126 pages (about 50,000 words) with arguments against the bomb;"
Mohamed Shahabuddeen of Guyana fifty-three pages (about 20,000
words);' 2 and Abdul G. Koroma of Sierra Leone, twenty-six pages (about
10,000 words). 3
Koroma was one of the judges mentioned above who voted against
paragraph (2)C because they believed that the gas protocols and other
conventions do ban nuclear weapons "as such." He voted against
paragraph (2)E because he read the Nuremberg tribunal as saying a State's
right to ensure its own survival is not unlimited," and the ICJ's own
Nicaragua case likewise." He found the fifty-year tradition of non-use
amply backed by an opiniojuris against the bomb, making it binding law."6
In one of the few references" to Hiroshima and Nagasaki by any member
of the Court, Koroma said: "It should not be forgotten that the Second
World War had witnessed the use of the atomic weapon in Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, resulting in the deaths of thousands of human beings. The
Second World War therefore came to be regarded as the period
epitomizing gross violations of human rights."'"
Koroma dismissed the distinction between treaty law, admittedly
binding, and humanitarian customary law, which the United States and
41. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 429-555 (Opinion of Weeramantry).
42. Id. at 375-428 (Opinion of Shahabuddeen).
43. Id. at 556-82 (Opinion of Koroma).
44. Id. at 556, 561 (Opinion of Koroma) (citing THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL SITrING AT NUREMBERG GERMANY, THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS, vol. 1 at 208.
45. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 556, 561 (Opinion of Koroma) (citing Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. REP. 14, 94).
46. Id. at 556, 578-79 (Opinion of Koroma).
47. Shahabuddeen quoted a Red Cross reaction to Hiroshima and Nagasaki and cited to the
Tokyo District Court ruling condemning those urbicides: Shimodo v. The State, 8 JAPANESE
ANN. OF INT'L L. 212, 235 (1964). Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 375, 383, 397 (Opinion
of Shahabuddeen). Weeramantry argued those bombings did not show that modem nuclear war
would be survivable because, for one thing, they did not involve the modem risk of escalation.
Id. at 429, 473-75 (Opinion of Weeramantry). Other references to the Japanese cities were
perfunctory or dealt only with the destruction and injury done there. For a summary of the
statements of the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, see id. at 556, 567-69 (Opinion of
Koroma).
48. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 556, 577 (Opinion of Koroma).
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others had urged the Court to leave to political consideration.49 He cited
several authorities rejecting such a double standard and holding that the
humanitarian side of customary law is part of the jus cogens binding on
all.-
Weeramantry and Shahabuddeen were as anti-nuclear as Koroma, and
wrote at greater length. The idea that nuclear weapons are essentially a
gas and are prohibited by the anti-gas protocols5' was rejected by the
majority of the Court, but many of their other points remain arguable law.
B. The Candid Nuclearist
The only unabashed apologist for the bomb was the American, Judge
Harold Schwebel, Vice President of the Court. Schwebel served for many
years in the office of the Legal Advisor in the United States State
Department. His opinion begins, "More than any case in the history of the
Court, this proceeding presents a titanic tension between State practice and
legal principle." 2
He claims that for a half-century, the threat to use nuclear weapons
has been clear and constant from the major States, States "that together
represent the bulk of the world's military and economic and financial and
technological power and a very large proportion of its population."" But
we know the vast majority of States do not possess nuclear weapons, and
those that possess them seldom or never make threats, even implicitly, and
have not used a nuclear weapon since 1945. This more accurate view of
State practice would take some of the titanic out of Judge Schwebel's
tension between practice and principle.
Schwebel takes similar liberties by enlisting the treaty regimes of the
last half-century on the pro-nuclear side of his tension. All the limited
nuclear bans, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, legitimize that which
they do not ban, he arguesM He carries this to the extreme of reading the
assurances of non-use the nuclear powers gave to the non-aligned, non-
nuclear signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as implying the threat
to use nuclear weapons elsewhere.55 As for the anti-nuclear General
49. Id. Written Statement of the Government of the United States of America, June 20,
1995. Unpublished. Source on file with author.
50. Id. at 556, 572-74 (Opinion of Koroma).
51. Id. at 429, 433 (Opinion of Weeramantry). See supra note 15.
52. Id. at 311 (Opinion of Schwebel).
53. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 311, 312 (Opinion of Schwebel).
54. Id at 311, 315-17. (Opinion of Schwebel). Many nations have said explicitly when
supporting these limited bans that they do not mean to validate bombs outside of the ban.
55. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 311, 315-17 (Opinion of Schwebel).
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Assembly resolutions, Schwebel requires that such resolutions be "adopted
unanimously (or virtually so, qualitatively as well as quantitatively) or by
consensus. . ." before they become evidence of the world's opiniojuris.'
Thus he claims that the resolutions passed by mere majorities serve only to
show that the law is the opposite of what they say.
Schwebel accepts the concessions of the nuclear powers that any
nuclear use is subject to the humanitarian principles of law." Those
principles are what make up the anti-nuclear side of his tension. He agrees
there is a problem in the deterrence theory of the nuclear States: It rests
on a professed willingness to incinerate millions of civilians with no
conceivable proportionality to any legitimate military objective, and such
behavior is against generally accepted principles of humanitarian law.
Faced with this contradiction, Schwebel comes close to concurring with the
Court's anti-nuclear ruling: "The use of nuclear weapons is, for the
reasons examined above, exceptionally difficult to reconcile with the rules
of international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly the principles
and rules of international humanitarian law.""
Further to his credit, Schwebel puts forth a hypothetical. What if a
rogue submarine were destroying cities and killing and threatening to kill
millions? Ordinary depth charges are powerless against it. Would it be
illegal to hit it with a nuclear depth charge, a clean nuclear explosion that
would save the threatened cities with no collateral damage, fallout, or risk
of escalation?
We asked for hypotheticals, so it is only fair that we give our
enthusiastic endorsement to this virtuous nuclear explosion. It sounds as
wholesome as a nuclear bomb vaporizing a giant meteor headed toward the
earth," and about as likely. In the post-nuclear world, there will be no
submarines capable of killing millions, and the greater safety lies in seeing
that such incapacity comes about as soon as possible.60 A legal rule should
56. Id. at 311,319.
57. Id. at 311.
58. Id. at 311,321.
59. Timothy Ferris, Annals of Space: Is This the End?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 27, 1997
at 44, 53-55 (discussing Edward Teller's proposals to prepare for just such a contingency).
60. Likewise for nuclear terrorism, where nuclear weapons in the hands of national
authorities would be of little value anyhow. Whatever the virtue or necessity of some residual
nuclear capability remaining with some authority, we are so far from that level of disarmament
that it is dishonest to talk about it. The present issue when we talk about law and rules is this:
Can the general rule against nuclear weapons per se be destroyed by improbable thought-
experiments or does the general ban, with its authorization to keep nuclear weapons away from
terrorists and rogue nations, stand as a general ban, whatever the limitations and defeasibility of
all verbal rules?
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condemn a source of danger, not condone it in the hope that it might
possibly in some extraordinary case serve as a homeopathic antidote to
itself. Schwebel's interest in this hypothetical reflects the same view as the
United States' filing with the Court:" the view that the Court should not
attempt to synthesize a verbal rule unless a treaty has led the way and
supplied the rule, and that any rule as verbalized must be indefeasible by
any conceivable set of circumstances. There is some authority for this
kind of judicial restraint in the healthy maxim nulla poena sine lege (no
punishment without a law), but as far as major crimes against humanity are
concerned, it was conclusively rejected at Nuremberg.
The underlying problem with Schwebel's approach is his allocation of
burdens of legal persuasion. If he encounters a divided view on any
nuclear issue, it is nuclearism that prevails, and restraint must bear the risk
of non-persuasion. He rests this on the adage that that which is not
prohibited is allowed-a sound principle, but one that does not apply to
mass destruction. With mass destruction, that which is not specifically and
affirmatively justified, and brought within some extraordinary license, is
illicit-because mass destruction is generally illicit. Schwebel's approach
is well-illustrated by some speculations about the 1991 Gulf War that take
up the final pages of his opinion. Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister,
has claimed that Iraq had been ready to use chemical and biological
warfare but was deterred by the veiled nuclear threats of United States
Secretary of State James Baker.Y Schwebel offers this as an instance of the
bomb having a healthy effect. His logic here is the eternal logic of
bellicism: The bomb gets credit for deterring everything the Iraqis did not
do, however speculative their ability to do it, but need accept no
embarrassment for what they actually did do, in defiance of the same
deterrent.
But putting aside this fundamentally misplaced presumption of
regularity, Schwebel's opinion presents issues at the crux- of this case:
1) How are the opinions of nations to be weighed? Do the great
powers outweigh the rest of the world in determining legal consensus?
Or are all foreign offices created equal? Or does the truth lie between
these extremes?
2) To what extent should any official or any commentator, including
the International Court of Justice, limit its discussion of international
61. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1. Written Statement of the Government of the United
States of America, June 20, 1995. Unpublished. Source on file with author.
62. Much skepticism has greeted Aziz's story. See William M. Arkin, 52 BULL. OF THE
ATOM. SCIENTISTS 64, (May/June 1996).
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law to written treaties, and dismiss the opinion of humanity because it
is diffuse and ill-defined?
3) Do the unwritten principles of humanitarian law ever ban a
particular weapon, or must those principles always address only the
results accomplished?
The first question will disappear if and when the United States and the
other nuclear powers cease opposing the rest of the world on the legality of
nuclear arms. The Court's ruling answers the second question for the
International Court of Justice at the Hague: The unwritten law of
humanitarian restraint is as real there as it was at Nuremberg a half-
century ago.6 The third question remains as the last-ditch defense of
nuclearism: Maybe we can't use our nuclear weapons and maybe we are
obliged to get rid of them, but just don't say that they are illegal per se.
The nuclearists' world may end not with a bang but a quibble.
We can be grateful to Schwebel for his clarity and candor. He voted
against paragraph (2)E because he saw no general illegality in the use of
nuclear weapons, and a clear majority of the Court voted down that theory.
VI. THE LAW As IT Now STANDS
Our review of the World Court's work has perhaps smacked of
ingratitude. The International Court of Justice is the closest we have to a
final authority in international law (even if it is not one, because nations
reserve the right to ignore its opinions). When such an authority condemns
the bomb, it seems ungrateful to complain of obscurity or lack of clarity.
The World Court accomplished much. Because of its efforts we can now
declare large areas of law settled. Let us try to outline the law as it now
stands. First, some obvious distinctions:
1) Categories of nuclear acts: research, development, acquisition,
stockpiling, deployment, threatening to use, and the actual use of
nuclear weapons.
2) Categories of use: peaceful explosions, testing, and the possible
combat uses, all of which have been hypothetical since 1945: tactical
use in controllable situations, limited escalations, counterforce
escalations, countervalue escalations, urbicide, genocide, omnicide,
ecocide, etc.
3) Sources of law: customs joined with an opiniojuris, including the
basic humanitarian laws of war; treaty regimes, also confusingly
called conventional law; and fully implemented rules acknowledged
63. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 265.
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by States and conveyed to their officials by laws, orders, and
regulations.
4) Criteria of legality: rules that forbid a given weapon per se, and
rules that forbid certain weapons because of the unlikelihood that they
can be used legally; rules that forbid a weapon by name, and rules
that denounce it by description.
With all of this factual and conceptual variety, and with the general
lack of institutional settlement in international law, there is much we
cannot say with authority. But if we focus on the use of nuclear weapons,
we find three points that are now generally accepted by nuclear and non-
nuclear States alike:
1) Any military use of nuclear weapons is subject to the unwritten
principles of humanitarian law, the law referred to in the Martens
clause."
2) These principles ban the targeting of civilians.6
3) They require economy and proportionality even when the targets
are military."
4) While the nuclear powers accept these points, they seem to have
trouble with what obviously follows: that any nuclear exchange
would be against international law as well as violating every other
standard of human conduct. So would any nuclear bombing of any
city." Only the most unlikely hypothetical use-against Schwebel's
rogue submarine, for instance-could avoid collateral consequences of
escalation and fallout enough to escape a ringing condemnation by
"the requirements of the public conscience." Even the smallest of
"tactical" nuclear artillery would bring down on the nation or group
using it the odium of humankind for crossing the nuclear threshold.6
64. Id. at 227, 266. The Martens clause says that, unless otherwise provided,
"populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of
international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the
laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience." See, e.g., Hague Convention
II of 1899, Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 32 Stat. 1803,
1805. See also 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L.: MARTENS' CLAUSE 326-27 (1997). A
more recent form of the Martens clause is quoted at Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 227,
257.
65. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 1, at 227, 257, 266.
66. Id. at 227, 245 (Opinion of the Court).
67. Id. at 227, 266.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 227, 245 (Opinion of the Court).
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Thus the half-century of non-use is not a legal irrelevancy. It has
given rise to law as clear as any written on paper and signed at conference
tables, and breaking it would cost any nation or group dearly. Counselors
who try to define this law out of existence will regret their words, should
anyone ever be foolish enough to act upon their advice.
VII. WHITHER Now?
Apart from all the considerations discussed above, humanitarian law
as well as treaty law should have something to say about the sheer mass of
the two largest nuclear arsenals, even after their post-Cold War reductions,
because no conceivable military or political threat can justify the risks of
omnicide and ecocide involved. There are several distinct principles at
work here: Any acquisition of a nuclear bomb is destabilizing and a threat
and should be denounced as illegally aggressive under the Charter,' in
addition to its illegality under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But quite
separate from this, and antecedent to even the simplest attempts at forming
international law, when a nuclear arsenal reaches the size that it becomes a
threat to the life of the planet itself as well as a threat to the peace, it must
acquire yet another dimension of illegality. None of this is covered in the
Court's opinion.
The Russian Federation and NATO have switched places since the
days of John Foster Dulles, but still the weaker side sees its nuclear
weapons as a cheap substitute for the prohibitively expensive buildup it
would need to reach a balance of conventional forces. This was American
doctrine under Truman and Eisenhower, when faced with the massive Red
Army sprawled over half of Europe," and it is the doctrine of the Russians
now, faced with NATO expanding into former Soviet satellites. It would
dramatically enhance the American margin of power if the nuclear
weapons were out of the order of battle.
On most of the above legal questions, the United States professes
doctrines different from the rest of the world. That is the chief source of
legal obscurity. Judge Schwebel and others find benefit in this obscurity.
This is the crux of this matter: Which is safer, a world professing the
illegality of nuclear weapons and seeking to suppress them by that
illegality, or a world professing their legitimacy and hoping to hold them
in check by their own dangerous effects, such as nuclear diplomacy and
70. Statement of the President of the Security Council, 1992 U.N.Y.B. 33, 35.
71. Bernard Baruch to John Foster Dulles, Oct. 5, 1948: "The only thing that stands in
the way of the over-running of Europe today is the atom bomb. When once we outlaw that,
there is nothing to stop the Russian advance." UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1948 448, 450 (Vol. 1, Part I, 1975).
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nuclear terror? Because the issue is not capable of experimental
resolution, the answer must turn on presumptions and judgment. When it
comes to the omnicidal arsenals now in place, and to the proposed
retention of enough of those arsenals for multiple genocides, the world
must vote down Judge Schwebel, his former colleagues in the Department
of State, and those of like mind in the Russian Federation.
Somewhere, sometime, there may have been a State that refrained
from an evil act because its legal advisors could not say nuclear retribution
against it would be illegal. It seems unlikely. But we kfiow for sure that
States such as India and Pakistan rely on the legal arguments of the nuclear
States when they claim the right to become nuclear. So we must seize the
chance the World Court has given us to rectify the legal confusion left over
from the 1940s and 1950s, and declare to, and for, all the planet that the
United States accepts the rule that no one may lawfully use a nuclear
weapon. Then we must give the Russian Federation the assurances it
needs so that all the nuclear powers may carry out the promise of Article
VI and rid the world of their nuclear weapons. If we let the present
window of relative opportunity pass, and if the Russian Federation is left
with its thousands of warheads-unstable, but cocked and ready to go-we
will deserve the curses of our descendants, if we have any.
